• SonicOS 7.0 Rules and Policies
• Access Rules
  • Setting Firewall Access Rules
    • About Connection Limiting
    • Using Bandwidth Management with Access Rules
      • Enabling Bandwidth Management on an Access Rule
    • Creating Access Rules
    • Configuring Access Rules for IPv6
      • About Stateful Packet Inspection Default Access Rules
    • Enabling and Disabling Access Rules
    • Editing Access Rules
    • Deleting Access Rules
    • Restoring Access Rules to Default Settings
    • Displaying Access Rules
      • By Zones
      • By Column
    • Displaying Access Rule Traffic Statistics
    • Configuring Access Rules for NAT64
    • Configuring Access Rules for a Zone
    • Access Rules for DNS Proxy
    • User Priority for Access Rules
  • Access Rule Configuration Examples
    • Enabling Ping
    • Blocking LAN Access for Specific Services
    • Allowing WAN Primary IP Access from the LAN Zone
• NAT Rules
  • About NAT in SonicOS
  • About NAT Load Balancing
    • Determining the NAT LB Method to Use
    • Caveats
    • How Load Balancing Algorithms are Applied
    • Sticky IP Algorithm Examples
      • Example One - Mapping to a Network
      • Example Two - Mapping to an IP Address Range
  • About NAT64
    • Use of Pref64::/n
  • About FQDN-based NAT
  • About Source MAC Address Override
  • Viewing NAT Policy Entries
    • Changing the Display
    • Filtering the Display
    • Displaying Information about Policies
  • Adding or Editing NAT or NAT64 Rule Policies
  • Deleting NAT Policies
  • Creating NAT Rule Policies: Examples
    • Creating a One-to-One NAT Policy for Inbound Traffic
    • Creating a One-to-One NAT Policy for Outbound Traffic
    • Inbound Port Address Translation via One-to-One NAT Policy
    • Inbound Port Address Translation via WAN IP Address
    • Creating a Many-to-One NAT Policy
    • Creating a Many-to-Many NAT Policy
    • Creating a One-to-Many NAT Load Balancing Policy
    • Creating a NAT Load Balancing Policy for Two Web Servers
    • Creating a WAN-to-WAN Access Rule for a NAT64 Policy
    • DNS Doctoring
• Routing
  • About Routing
    • About Metrics and Administrative Distance
      • About Metrics
      • About Administrative Distance
    • Route Advertisement
    • ECMP Routing
    • Policy-based Routing
    • Policy-based TOS Routing
    • PBR Metric-based Priority
    • Policy-based Routing and IPv6
    • OSPF and RIP Advanced Routing Services
      • About Routing Services
        • Protocol Type
        • Maximum Hops
        • Split-Horizon
        • Poison Reverse
        • Routing Table Updates
        • Subnet Sizes Supported
        • Autonomous System Topologies
      • OSPF Terms
    • Drop Tunnel Interface
    • App-based Routing
  • Rules and Policies >
    • Configuring
      • Adding Static Routes
      • Probe-Enabled Policy-based Routing Configuration
• Content Filter Rules
  • About Content Filtering Rules (CFS)
    • About Content Filter Rules
    • About UUIDs for CFS Policies
    • About Content Filter Action Objects
    • How CFS Works
  • Configuring CFS Policies
    • About the Content Filter Rule Table
      • Searching the Content Filter Rule Table
    • Adding a Content Filter Rule
    • Editing a Content Filter Rule
    • Deleting Content Filter Rules
• App Rules
  • About App Rules
    • What are App Rules?
      • About App Rules Policies
      • About App Rules Capabilities
    • Benefits of App Rules
    • How Does Application Control Work?
    • About App Rules Policy Creation
    • Licensing App Rules and App Control
    • Terminology
  • Rules and Policies > App Rules
    • Configuring an App Rules Policy
  • Verifying App Rules Configuration
    • Useful Tools
      • Wireshark
      • Hex Editor
  • App Rules Use Cases
    • Creating a Regular Expression in a Match Object
    • Policy-based Application Rules
    • Logging Application Signature-based Policies
    • Compliance Enforcement
    • Server Protection
    • Hosted Email Environments
    • Email Control
    • Web Browser Control
    • HTTP Post Control
    • Forbidden File Type Control
    • ActiveX Control
    • FTP Control
      • Blocking Outbound Proprietary Files Over FTP
      • Blocking Outbound UTF-8 / UTF-16 Encoded Files
      • Blocking FTP Commands
    • Bandwidth Management
    • Bypass DPI
    • Custom Signature
    • Reverse Shell Exploit Prevention
      • Generating the Network Activity
      • Capturing and Exporting the Payload to a Text File Using Wireshark
      • Creating a Match Object
      • Defining the Policy
• Endpoint Rules
• SonicWall Support
  • About This Document

Reverse Shell Exploit Prevention

The reverse shell exploit is an attack that you can prevent by using the App Rules custom signature capability (see Custom Signature). A reverse shell exploit could be used by an attacker if he or she is successful in gaining access to your system by means of a Zero-day exploit. A Zero-day exploit refers to an attack whose signature is not yet recognized by security software.

In an early stage while still unknown, malicious payloads can pass through the first line of defense which is the IPS and Gateway Anti-Virus (GAV) running at the Internet gateway, and even the second line of defense represented by the host-based Anti-Virus software, allowing arbitrary code execution on the target system.

In many cases, the executed code contains the minimal amount of instructions needed for the attacker to remotely obtain a command prompt window (with the privileges of the exploited service or logged on user) and proceed with the penetration from there.

As a common means to circumvent NAT/firewall issues, which might prevent their ability to actively connect to an exploited system, attackers make the vulnerable system execute a reverse shell. In a reverse shell, the connection is initiated by the target host to the attacker address, using well-known TCP/UDP ports for better avoidance of strict outbound policies.

This use case is applicable to environments hosting Windows systems and intercepts unencrypted connections over all TCP/UDP ports.

Networks using unencrypted Telnet service must configure policies that exclude those servers’ IP addresses.

While this use case refers to the specific case of reverse shell payloads (outbound connections), it is more secure to configure the policy to be effective also for inbound connections. This protects against a case where the executed payload spawns a listening shell onto the vulnerable host and the attacker connects to that service across misconfigured firewalls.

The actual configuration requires the following

• Generating the actual network activity to be fingerprinted, using the netcat tool
• Capturing the activity and exporting the payload to a text file, using the Wireshark tool
• Creating a match object with a string that is reasonably specific and unique enough to avoid false positives
• Defining a policy with the action to take when a payload containing the object is parsed (the default Reset/Drop is used here)

• Generating the Network Activity
• Capturing and Exporting the Payload to a Text File, Using Wireshark
• Creating a Match Object
• Defining the Policy