SonicOS 7.1 Rules and Policies for Classic Mode
- SonicOS 7.1 Rules and Policies
- Overview
- Access Rules
- Setting Firewall Access Rules
- About Connection Limiting
- Using Bandwidth Management with Access Rules
- Creating Access Rules
- Configuring Access Rules for IPv6
- Enabling and Disabling Access Rules
- Editing Access Rules
- Deleting Access Rules
- Restoring Access Rules to Default Settings
- Displaying Access Rules
- Displaying Access Rule Traffic Statistics
- Configuring Access Rules for NAT64
- Configuring Access Rules for a Zone
- Access Rules for DNS Proxy
- User Priority for Access Rules
- Access Rule Configuration Examples
- Setting Firewall Access Rules
- NAT Rules
- About NAT in SonicOS
- About NAT Load Balancing
- About NAT64
- About FQDN-based NAT
- About Source MAC Address Override
- Viewing NAT Policy Entries
- Adding or Editing NAT or NAT64 Rule Policies
- Deleting NAT Policies
- Creating NAT Rule Policies: Examples
- Creating a One-to-One NAT Policy for Inbound Traffic
- Creating a One-to-One NAT Policy for Outbound Traffic
- Inbound Port Address Translation via One-to-One NAT Policy
- Inbound Port Address Translation via WAN IP Address
- Creating a Many-to-One NAT Policy
- Creating a Many-to-Many NAT Policy
- Creating a One-to-Many NAT Load Balancing Policy
- Creating a NAT Load Balancing Policy for Two Web Servers
- Creating a WAN-to-WAN Access Rule for a NAT64 Policy
- DNS Doctoring
- Routing
- DNS Rules
- Content Filter Rules
- App Rules
- About App Rules
- Rules and Policies > App Rules
- Verifying App Rules Configuration
- App Rules Use Cases
- Creating a Regular Expression in a Match Object
- Policy-based Application Rules
- Logging Application Signature-based Policies
- Compliance Enforcement
- Server Protection
- Hosted Email Environments
- Email Control
- Web Browser Control
- HTTP Post Control
- Forbidden File Type Control
- ActiveX Control
- FTP Control
- Bandwidth Management
- Bypass DPI
- Custom Signature
- Reverse Shell Exploit Prevention
- Endpoint Rules
- SonicWall Support
Reverse Shell Exploit Prevention
The reverse shell exploit is an attack that you can prevent by using the App Rules custom signature capability (see Custom Signature). A reverse shell exploit could be used by an attacker if he or she is successful in gaining access to your system by means of a Zero-day exploit. A Zero-day exploit refers to an attack whose signature is not yet recognized by security software.
In an early stage while still unknown, malicious payloads can pass through the first line of defense which is the IPS and Gateway Anti-Virus (GAV) running at the Internet gateway, and even the second line of defense represented by the host-based Anti-Virus software, allowing arbitrary code execution on the target system.
In many cases, the executed code contains the minimal amount of instructions needed for the attacker to remotely obtain a command prompt window (with the privileges of the exploited service or logged on user) and proceed with the penetration from there.
As a common means to circumvent NAT/firewall issues, which might prevent their ability to actively connect to an exploited system, attackers make the vulnerable system execute a reverse shell. In a reverse shell, the connection is initiated by the target host to the attacker address, using well-known TCP/UDP ports for better avoidance of strict outbound policies.
This use case is applicable to environments hosting Windows systems and intercepts unencrypted connections over all TCP/UDP ports.
Networks using unencrypted Telnet service must configure policies that exclude those servers’ IP addresses.
While this use case refers to the specific case of reverse shell payloads (outbound connections), it is more secure to configure the policy to be effective also for inbound connections. This protects against a case where the executed payload spawns a listening shell onto the vulnerable host and the attacker connects to that service across misconfigured firewalls.
The actual configuration requires the following
- Generating the actual network activity to be fingerprinted, using the netcat tool
- Capturing the activity and exporting the payload to a text file, using the Wireshark tool
- Creating a match object with a string that is reasonably specific and unique enough to avoid false positives
- Defining a policy with the action to take when a payload containing the object is parsed (the default Reset/Drop is used here)
- Generating the Network Activity
- Capturing and Exporting the Payload to a Text File, Using Wireshark
- Creating a Match Object
- Defining the Policy
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